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The objective of this paper is to re-evaluate the attitude to eﬀo r to far i s k - a v e r s ed e c i s i o n -
maker in an evolving environment. In the classical analysis, the space of eﬀorts is generally
discretized. More realistic, this new approach employes a continuum of eﬀort levels. The pres-
ence of multiple possible eﬀorts and performance levels provide a better basis for explaining real
economic phenomena. In the context of a principal-agent relationship, not only the incentives
of the Principal can determine the private agent to exert a good eﬀort, but also the evolution
of the dynamic system. The dynamic incentives can be ineﬀective when the environment does
not suﬃciently incite the agent to allocate eﬀort. This possible scenario explains why some
eﬃcient strategic incentive-compatible constraints that cover the entire period of contract do
not generally exist. The proposed approach oﬀers an elegant study of the close relationship
between behavior, attitude and eﬀort allocation.
Keywords: Rational decision-maker, endogenous dynamic learning, adaptive eﬀort man-
agement, optimal eﬀort threshold, eﬀort aversion, excessive eﬀort behavior.
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1. Introduction
Consider a rational decision-maker characterized by a consistent and eﬃcient outcome
oriented behavior (Dreze 1990; Walsh 1996) who utilizes a set of control instruments in
order to constrain the system to follow an optimal trajectory ensuring its equilibrium and
stability.
The decision-maker adjusts to keep small the diﬀerence between the actual and assumed
system characteristics by supervising and managing the system behavior. At each control
period, his uncertainty level is determined by the deviations of the system from a ﬁxed reference
path. High (small) deviations from the ﬁxed targets correspond to a high (small) level of
uncertainty.
In general, a consistent behavior in problems of decision-making implies risk-aversion char-
acterized by risky actions implemented by the decision-maker. It characterizes the majority of
decision-makers, at least for high proﬁts or important losses.
The degree of information included in the observation of the state variable generally depends
on the values chosen for the control instruments, so that the extent of the learning on the
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1latent parameters of the system can be directly inﬂuenced by the decision-maker. He has
a certain inﬂuence over the rate at which the information arrives, so that his behavior may
generate information. The active learning makes the decision-maker more experienced over
time. However, despite of potential beneﬁts from active learning in stochastic optimization
problems, the potential for learning is very limited if the model is noisy (Easley and Kiefer
1988; Kiefer and Nyarko 1989).
The analysis is placed in the context of a closed-loop strategy, the information being utilized
by the decision-maker in real time. His objective is to reduce the uncertainty related to the
choice of his actions by acquiring information from the beginning of the control to the moment
of decision. The feedback control responds not only to the eﬀects of random inputs, but also
to the measurement errors as well. It is thus useless to identify and measure the sources of
disturbance.
The fact that the decision-maker is risk-averse by nature does not give any obvious reason
for which one should also suppose that he is eﬀort-averse. Uncertainty generally depreciates
the activity of the decision-maker and produces a temporary stability followed by a longer or
shorter period of adaptation in instability which implies an additional eﬀort allocated by the
decision-maker in order to reduce the probability of a high deviation to occur.
The evolution of the dynamic system has an important impact on the decision-maker’s
eﬀort behavior over time. The higher the system ﬂuctuations, the higher the eﬀort exerted.
The eﬀort level invested by the decision-maker at each period of control will also depend on
the importance attached to the history of the process, as well as on his eﬀort-averse type.
The objective of the present study is to explore the relationship between attitude, behavior,
and perceived eﬀort in dynamic risky environments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 proposes a
reﬁnement of the eﬀort concept by integrating in the analysis a truncated /progressive history
of the dynamic environment. Section 4 obtains several qualitative results with regard to the
decision-maker’s attitude to eﬀort during the period of control. It also provides an interesting
analysis of the decision-maker’s eﬀort preferences and discusses the case of high potential shifts.
Section 5 introduces the concept of (excessive) eﬀort-aversion according to an optimal eﬀort-
threshold which characterizes the agent’s type. It is analyzed here the relationship between
agent’s eﬀort allocation and horizon length. Section 6 concludes and makes suggestions for
future research.
2. The Model
The type of model we analyze corresponds to a data generation process which is dynamic,
nonlinear and managed by a system of discrete simultaneous equations.
Let xt ∈ Rq be the control variable at time t,l e tyt ∈ Rp b et h et a r g e tv a r i a b l ei nt,a n d
let zt ∈ Rr be an exogenous variable not subjected to the agent’s control at the time period t.
Denote by Xt = {...,x−1,x 0,x 1,...,xt} the history of the process x up to time t,a n ds i m i l a r l y
for Yt and Zt. We allow for the current state variable to depend not only on the agent’s
current decision but also on an arbitrarily complex history Xt. We make the following basic
assumptions:
Assumption 1. The evolution of the environment is modelled by a nonlinear extended-
memory process generated according to the structural state equation:
yt = F(Yt−1,Xt,Zt,e t,βt,t)+ut,t ∈ Z
The adjustment function F is assumed twice continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to
βt ∈ Rk (the time-varying parameter to be estimated). The variable et represents the agent’s
2eﬀort employed for the period t. The exogenous unobserved random shock ut ∈ Rp is the speciﬁc
“risk” modelled by a normal distribution with zero mean-vector and ﬁnite variance-covariance
matrix Ψ.
In general, yt is not a Gaussian process. Obviously, non-linearity between yt and Yt−1
implies non-normality and hence an asymmetric dynamic. The variable t plays the role of a
synthesis variable in the econometric model.








T} by selecting the control variable xt in a suitable way. Taking into
account foreseeable movements in y as well as possible economic constraints, the agent will ﬁx
some optimal bounds lt such that 0 <y
g
t ≤ lt < 1, t =1 ,...,T.
Assumption 3. The timing of the control is as follows: At each period t,t h ea g e n t
implements an optimal action xt, which is a stimulus for the dynamic environment. This is
purported to contribute to the stability of the evolving system. A shock ut is carried out and
the agent observes the output yt (the impulse response) from which he extracts a dynamic
signal about the future trend of the system. The information revealed by the output signal can
increase the precision of the next control instrument. This signal and the corresponding action
provide information on the data generating process. The agent will employ this output signal
for a strategic learning (speciﬁc to a closed-loop monitoring) in order to reduce his uncertainty
over time. The question is: How this signal will inﬂuence the agent’s eﬀort behavior during the
period of control?
Assumption 4. The optimality of the instrument xt is considered according to a global
criterion W(y1,y 2,...,y T) which measures the system deviations M yt
not. = yt − y
g
t, t =1 ,...,T.
This is supposed twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and convex in the feasible
area of the model.







where Wt is a quadratic asymmetric loss function given by:
Wt(yt)









with a prime denoting transpose.
T h ec h o i c eo ft h ep a r a m e t e r sKt and dt reﬂects the priorities of the agent and also depends
on the available amount of information concerning the future development of the system pa-
rameters. At each time t, the parameters Kt and dt are updated and new optimal values are
selected to fulﬁl lt h er e q u i r e m e n t so ft h ea g e n t .
Assumption 5.A t e a c h p e r i o d t, the agent must compute his optimal policy b xt before
knowing the initial state y0. He therefore obtains a random policy, conditional to y0:
b xt =a r g m a x
xt
Et−1[Ut(W[1,t],ϕ t) | y0]
where Et−1(·)
not. = E(·|It−1) is the operator of conditional expectation based on the information
available in t−1, ϕt represents the absolute risk-aversion index in t,a n dUt is the agent’s local
























where a prime denotes the partial derivative with respect to W[1,t].
Therefore,
ϕt(W[1,t])
2 measures locally (at the point W[1,t])t h ea g e n t ’ sr i s ka v e r s i o n ,Ut being
a CARA utility. Diﬀerent contexts call for diﬀerent optimal actions.
3. Dynamic Eﬀort Modelling
Although there is an extensive literature on eﬀort (Block and Heineke 1973; Sap-
pington 1991; Laffont and Tirole 1993; Salanie 1997; Laffont and Martimort
2002; Laffont 2003; Ippolito 2003; Oyer 2004; Bolton and Dewatripont 2005;
Epstein and Nitzan 2006; Shapiro 2006; Lee and Rupp 2007; Fong and Tosi Jr
2007; Strobl and Walsh 2007, amongst others), there is no theoretical and empirical
work for comparing and evaluating the degree of eﬀort-aversion of risk-averse decision-makers
in the context of controlled dynamic stochastic environments.
The objective of this section is to propose a new deﬁnition of the eﬀo r tc o n c e p tw i t hi m -
portant implications on the agent’s adaptive behavior in an evolving environment.
In dynamic stochastic optimization problems, but not only, the agent’s eﬀort level depends
on the history of the process, as well as on the importance the agent places on the past. It
implies a permanent adjustment process of the eﬀort variable over time.
We formalize this point of view for a general class of models and we detail the positive
eﬀects that it implies in the context of a dynamic stochastic system which evolves over a ﬁnite
and discrete horizon.
We make the following useful notations:
St, p_d
not. = k yt−1 − y
g
t−1 k




(the sum of squared past deviations at time t)
St, w_p_d
not. = k yt−1 − y
g
t−1 k




(the weighted sum of squared past deviations at time t)
where Lt−j1 (j1 =1 ,...,k 1;1≤ k1 <T) are strategic weights attached to the system deviations




t−k1} verifying the sequence of inequalities:
−1 <L t−1 ≤ ... ≤ Lt−k1 ≤ 0
Deﬁnition 1.U s i n gt to denote time, the absolute risk-aversion index ϕ
r_a
t, p evolves accord-







t, p_d + l
,t =1 ,...,T
where l ≥ 1 is an integer characterizing the agent’s type.
The weights may diﬀer across individuals. They are updated each time as new observation
becomes available. The agent gives a higher importance to the deviations which are closer
to the moment of implementation of a new optimal action. The higher (smaller) the weight,
4the smaller (higher) the importance given by the agent to the system deviation from his local
objective. Given the potential destabilizing role of a long memory of the process, the agent
takes into account only a limited history in the risk analysis. Distant past observations might
increase signiﬁcantly the bias of the estimators in the econometric model. It generally exists
an arbitrary element as regards the choice of the backward lag k1. The objective is to ﬁnd
the better compromise between ﬁt and complexity. For further details, see Protopopescu
(2007).
In order to optimize the eﬀort during the period of control, the agent will take into account
two distinct aspects: i) the eﬀect of the last deviation of the system (at time t − 1); and ii)
the mixed eﬀect of the other system deviations, from t−2 to t−k1 −1. The agent’s degree of
risk-aversion at time t − 1 integrates this latter eﬀect. It is assumed that the eﬀo r tv a r i a b l ei s
multiplicative separable in these two distinct eﬀects.
We are now in a position to give a deﬁnition of the eﬀort variable by taking into account a
truncated history of the system performances as well as the agent’s degree of risk-aversion.
Deﬁnition 2:U s i n g t to denote time, the eﬀort variable e
r_a
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g
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0 <s≤ 1; 1 <d≤ 2 (ﬁxed real numbers)
It is important to note that s and d are two strategic parameters characterizing the agent’s
type.
The above deﬁnition expresses the idea that the risk-aversion can be viewed as eﬀort incen-
tive. Moreover, the planning eﬀort can be regarded as an eﬀective risk management tool. The
eﬀort invested depends on the way the agent exploits and interprets the system evolution. It
does not always take a minimal value as the intuition would suggest.
F o rt h i st y peo fm od e l l i n g ,t h ee ﬀort is no more seen as a pure disutility, like in the traditional
approach, but rather as an eﬃcient instrument to optimally manage the system trajectory.
There may be periods when the interest of the agent is to increase the eﬀort in order to
perform his objectives.
The eﬀort level at a given period t depends on all previous eﬀorts invested by the agent.
It allows for an addaptive eﬀort management during the period of control. There exist a close
relationship between the agent’s eﬀort allocation and his strategic objectives. The smaller the
ﬁxed targets, the higher the eﬀort level invested. Increases in the eﬀort cost (measured in terms
of disutility) result in reduced eﬀort levels. This is a consequence of the importance the agent
places on the system deviations.
Since a real time control process is necessarily discrete, this cannot converge with precision
to any target value, but only to a neighborhood of it. When the process of control is ﬁnished,
the agent will obtain a stochastic neighbouring-optimal trajectory which is expected to be close
to the optimal path η.T h e e ﬀort level will be hence strictly positive. In other words, the
eﬀort invested by the agent is always necessary (but not always suﬃcient) in order to reach a
ﬁxed objective. For small symmetric deviations with respect to the ﬁxed targets, the agent will
adopt the same attitude to eﬀo r ta tt i m et. By contrast, the restriction imposed on the ﬁxed
targets does not allow for a symmetric evolution of the system for large variations.
Remark 1. There is no loss of generality in considering that the eﬀort variable et takes
values in [0,1) because one can always ﬁnd an isomorphism from [0,1) to [0,a),w i t ha ≥ 1 a
ﬁxed real number.
5In the traditional approach (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Cantor 1987; Boadway et
al. 2003, among others), it is often supposed that workers either provide no eﬀort or a
unit level of eﬀort over time. In the ﬁrst case, the eﬀort is regarded to be low, while in the
second case, it is considered to be large. This type of modelling is “myopic” with regard to
potential changes in the agent’s attitude to eﬀort due to inherent endogenous ﬂuctuations of
the system over time. These two restrictive cases oﬀer a poor characterization of the agent’s
eﬀort behavior in an evolving environment.
Remark 2. Large system deviations with respect to the optimal path η leads to the
following condition:
k yt−j1 − y
g
t−j1 kÀ 1,j 1 =1 ,...,k 1
4. Qualitative Results on Eﬀort Allocation
The traditional approach does not take into account the potential eﬀect of the system
dynamics on the agent’s eﬀort behavior over time. The objective of this section is to develop
realistic scenarios for the environment in order to reveal the agent’s adaptive eﬀort behavior
during the period of control.
To illustrate why the proposed deﬁnition is informative about how attitudes to eﬀort of the
agent change over time, we prove several theoretical results in this direction.
Proposition 1.T h ee ﬀort invested by a risk-averse agent is non-monotonous over time.
Proof. In the appendix. ¥
This type of behavior is natural in the real world. However, in particular cases, it is possible
to obtain a monotonous conﬁguration of the eﬀort during the period of control.
We develop this idea later when analyzing the impact of a progressive transition of the
system on the agent’s eﬀort behavior over time.
We give below a graphical illustration of the Proposition 1.

























small and large weighting scalars; s=0.3; d=1.3
Figure 1
Diﬀerent contexts do not necessarily call for diﬀerent eﬀort levels. It is possible for the agent
to assign the same eﬀort level for distinct periods of time. This may be the case of a smooth
(almost constant) evolution of the system. By smooth evolution we understand either small or
large comparable deviations. A slow inertia of the system contributes to the realization of this
type of scenario.
We illustrate below this type of behavior in three diﬀerent contexts:
i) large system deviations and large weighting scalars;
ii) small system deviations and small weighting scalars;
iii) mixed (small and large) deviations and mixed (small and large) weighting scalars.






















large weighting scalars; s=0.3; d=1.3
Figure 2-i)
























small weighting scalars; s=0.5; d=1.5
Figure 3-ii)






















small and large weighting scalars; s=0.3; d=1.3
Figure 4-iii)
4.1. Analysis of Agent’s Preferences
In a dynamic stochastic environment, the agent’s preferences evolve according to the system
ﬂuctuations. These are represented at each time period by an utility function which is supposed
























with D a twice continuously diﬀerentiable function such that:
D(e
r_a
t, p ) > 0,D
0(e
r_a
t, p ) > 0,D
00(e
r_a
t, p ) > 0, ∀ e
r_a
t, p ∈ [0,1),∀ t =1 ,...,T
The agent’s preferences are reﬁned on the basis of a non-decreasing endogenous information
set. The agent can draw beneﬁt from the learning of his preferences. The intuition for this
point of view comes from the dynamic dimension of the problem.
Let W[1,t] and ϕ
r_a
t, p be arbitrarly ﬁxed. It is easy to see that Ut(e
r_a
t, p ) is a decreasing concave
function in e
r_a
t, p . This is in agreement with economic theory and empirical evidence. For the
generality sake, let us suppose for D the following quadratic parametrization:
D(e
r_a





t, p ∈ [0,1),t =1 ,...,T
where c ∈ (0,1) is a strategic parameter chosen according to the agent’s eﬀort-averse type.
7We develop this idea later when introducing the concept of more /less eﬀort-averse agent.
Note that a smaller value of the parameter c ensures to the agent a higher utility level
during the entire period of control. For an illustration, we give below two superposed graphics
for diﬀerent values of c.




















































t, p is large (small) and W[1,t] and e
r_a





t, p ) is large (small).
Proof. In the appendix. ¥
It is far from probable that the agent exactly maximizes his utility function at each stage
of the control. We rather face a nearly optimization behavior, where the control variable is
continuously and optimally adjusted over time to maximize some objective function (Van de
Stadt et al. 1985; Varian 1990).
We point out that a great class of decision rules are representable by a variation of the
utility between two consecutive periods (Gilboa 1989). This comes to treat the same agent
at diﬀerent times as diﬀerent individuals (Allais 1947).
This situation is formally equivalent to that one speciﬁc to a game in which decisions are
made by a sequence of heterogenous planners (Phelps and Pollak 1968).
The stochastic disturbance in the system will produce random shocks in the agent’s prefer-
ences over time. Uncertainty can change the agent’s behavior.
We give below two suggestive graphics illustrating the evolution of the agent’s utility func-
tion Ut with respect to ϕ
r_a
t, p , W[1,t],a n de
r_a
t, p .






















































































It is possible for the agent to have the same utility level for distinct periods of time. Diﬀerent
contexts do not necessarily call for diﬀerent preferences. We illustrate this possibility by a
suggestive graphic.






























Remark 3. The agent will allocate a negligible (almost null) eﬀort level at time t when
the system deviation at time t − 1 is negligible (almost null).
The dynamic environment does not always incite the economic agent to invest a good ef-
fort level. It may be the case when all system deviations are small or the last deviation of
the system is negligible (almost null). We illustrate this particular behavior in Figure 9 below.























small weighting scalars; s=0.5; d=2
Figure 9
W eo b s e r v eh e r et h a tt h ea g e n t ’ se ﬀo r ti n v e s t e da tt i m et =3 , t =5 , t =8 ,a n dt =1 0is
almost null. This is a consequence of the importance the agent places on the system deviations
a tt h ep r e v i o u sp e r i o d s .T h eo t h e rv a l u e so ft h ee ﬀort can be considered as negligible.
This type of result has important implications for the design of incentive mechanism in the
context of a dynamic principal-agent relationship. In general, the compensation paid to the
agent is based on his performances because his inputs are not veriﬁable in court. Note here
that diﬀerent levels of performance can occur when agents exert similar eﬀorts.
Given that the eﬀort is not fully observable, it cannot be made the subject of any explicit
contract. The objective of the Principal is to inﬂuence the choice of the private agent’s action by
conditioning his utility on the outcome, and hence oﬀering to him a recompense which depends
on its level.
For this type of contract, the output is considered to be of strategic importance, and hence
it is not allowed to exceed a speciﬁc magnitude. The recompense is supposed to increase with
the success of the agent in obtaining a high performance. The Principal’s decision cost increases
with the incentive levels.
For the above scenario, regardless of the system deviation in t =2 , t =4 , t =7and t =9 ,
the eﬀo r ti n v e s t e db yt h ea g e n tf o rt h en e x tp e r i o d si sa l m o s tn u l l .T h u s ,i nt h ec a s ew h e r ea l l
system deviations would be small, the recompenses granted to the agent would be uncorrelated
with the eﬀort allocated. Equilibrium outcome will be realized with a very low eﬀort level.
9Contrary to what is generally believed or intuition would suggest, this type of scenario
proves that the eﬀort level is not always high in equilibrium. This explains why, in the context
of a dynamic principal-agent relationship, it may be possible for the incentives to be ineﬀective
when the environment does not incite the agent to allocate a good eﬀort. In other words, some
eﬃcient strategic incentive-compatible constraints that cover the entire period of contract do
not generally exist.
The strategy of the Principal to restrict attention to the class of allocations satisfying the
(ex-ante) incentive-compatible constraints is not always optimal. This does not necessarily
ensure that the agent will not misrepresent his private information and preferences. It makes
sense to announce his characteristics if the Principal can design a mechanism that incites the
a g e n tt od ot h i st r u t h f u l l y .
The revelation principle (“the truth is dominant strategy”) simpliﬁes the Principal’s problem
but it cannot always be restricted to an allocation that gives to the agent no incentive to
misrepresent his type. In general, there is not a strict implementation because the truth is
not the unique equilibrium of the game. Due to the externality in the utility functions, strict
dominant strategy implementation is not generally feasible.
The information asymmetry and costly acquisition of information impose restrictions on
the Principal’s behavior. The incentives will typically be provided at each period of control.
However, even if the process is incentive-compatible at each step, the agent’s actions will not
necessarily reveal the truth at any time of the contract period. Generally, the incentive mecha-
nism is subjected to inescapable informational constraints. This is sensitive to the environment
description and the size of informational asymmetries.
The strategic weights attached to the system deviations with respect to the ﬁxed targets are
correlated with the importance the agent places on the incentives implemented by the Principal.
Agent’s actions are not directly punished, but only his poor performances.
The present model has the potential to explain the adaptive eﬀort behavior of the agent. It
can be seen as a step further in the reﬁnement of the eﬀort concept, providing new perspectives
of research for theorists and empirical analysts.
The possibility of a null eﬀo r to ft h ea g e n ta tag i v e np e r i o dt is taken into account in the
present model. It is the case when the agent does not attribute any importance to the system
deviation in t − 1. We illustrate below this particular behavior by a numerical example.

























small and large weighting scalars; s=0.3; d=1.3
Figure 10
Remark 4. An interesting relationship emerges between risk and eﬀort. The strategy
adopted by the agent to minimize the risk will also minimize the eﬀort. The opposite is not
generally true.
Deﬁnition 3. Two deviations of the system are said to be comparable in magnitude if and
only if their ratio is very close to 1.
10Proposition 3. An almost risk-neutral agent can allocate a higher eﬀort than a risk-averse
one.
Proof. In the appendix. ¥
This is an astonishing result, far from intuitive. It proves that eﬀort attitude and behavior
towards risk are not always positive correlated.
The proposed model reveals surprising attitudes to eﬀort of risk-averse agents. We give
below two suggestive graphics in this sense.


























almost risk-neutral decision-maker; s=0.5;d=1.3
Figure 11




























Proposition 4. If all system deviations are high and comparable in magnitude, then the
eﬀort invested by the agent is highly correlated with the importance he places on the system
evolution in the past.
Proof. In the appendix. ¥
W ec o n s i d e rt w od i s t i n c ts c e n a r i o s :i )w h e nt h es t r a t e g i cw e i g h t sa r el a r g e ;a n di i )w h e nt h e
strategic weights are small. The ﬁrst (second) scenario corresponds to the case of a less (more)
eﬀort-averse agent by nature. For an illustration, we give below two suggestive graphics in this
sense.


























high weighting scalars; l=2; k1=3;s=0.5;d=1.5
Figure 13























small weighting scalars; l=2; k1=3;s=0.5;d=1.5
Figure 14
Let us now consider the context where all system deviations are high and comparable in
magnitude.
Proposition 5. If a higher number of backward periods are taken into account when esti-
mating the risk-aversion index, then a lower eﬀort will be invested by the agent for the same
period of control.
Proof. In the appendix. ¥
This result proves the importance of the history of the process in the eﬀort assignment over
time. The eﬀort varies with the environmental context and the way the agent exploits and
interprets the system dynamics.
11We give below a graphical illustration of the Proposition 5.
























Let us now consider the context where the agent has the interest to use a progressive history
of the process for the estimation of the risk-aversion index. This may be the case where the
horizon length is short and the economic agent needs more information useful in improving the
process of risk assessment. In this particular context, the risk-aversion index is given by:
Deﬁnition 4.U s i n gt to denote time, the absolute risk-aversion index ϕ
r_a






k yt−1 − y
g
t−1 k2 Lt−1 + ... + k y0 − y
g
0 k2 L0 p
(k yt−1 − y
g
t−1 k2 +... + k y0 − y
g
0 k2)2 + l
,t =1 ,...,T
where −1 <L t−1 ≤ Lt−2 ≤ ... ≤ L0 ≤ 0 are strategic weights attached to the system deviations




0} and l ≥ 1 is a ﬁxed integer characterizing
the agent’s type. For further details, see Protopopescu (2007).
Proposition 6. A risk-averse agent who manages more and more hardly the evolution of
the system will invest more and more eﬀort over time.
Proof. In the appendix. ¥
The environmental context can decide the agent’s eﬀort behavior during the period of con-
trol. The eﬀort invested by the agent is necessary but not always suﬃcient to improve the
system target variable. It may be the case of a system characterized by a slow inertia, whose
tendency is to move towards a disequilibrium state. The eﬃciency of the control instruments
plays a crucial role in the eﬀort allocation over time. Better instruments allow for better eﬀort
management. For a numerical illustration of the Proposition 6,w eg i v eb e l o was u g g e s t i v e
graphic.



























This result proves that in environments with a slow inertia, the incentive mechanism imple-
mented by the Principal may not ensure an optimal equilibrium of the game. Even for a high
12eﬀort invested, the private agent may not be recompensed. Moreover, the agent can be pun-
ished by the Principal for his deviating behavior. In this particular context, a principal-agent
relationship on a long-term cannot be incitative for the private agent.
Proposition 7. A risk-averse agent who manages better and better the evolution of the
system will invest less and less eﬀort over time.
Proof. In the appendix. ¥
This type of scenario is speciﬁc to dynamic environments characterized by a high inertia.
In this particular context, it is possible to obtain small deviations of the system by investing a
small eﬀort. For a numerical illustration, we give below a suggestive graphic.
























This type of result has the potential to explain why, in the context of a dynamic principal-
agent relationship, the incentive-compatibility constraints imposed by the Principal are not
always optimal. The agent can obtain a high recompense with a low eﬀort level.
4.2. High Potential Shifts
Shift happens. The agent learns from failures. Every high deviation, seen as a failure, is
analyzed in order to avoid unexpected ﬂuctuations of the system in the future. A large deviation
from the expected outcome is perceived as a shift by the agent. We call a high positive shift
the transition of the system from consecutive small levels of performance to a high level one.
In the opposite case, we call this type of transition a high negative shift. The agent’s objective
during the period of control is to obtain smooth shifts with respect to the ﬁxed targets. This
contributes to the equilibrium and stability of the system. The concept of eﬀort-aversion is
appropriate to dynamic stochastic environments whose behavior change signiﬁcantly over time.
I ti st h ec a s eo fh i g hﬂuctuating systems.
Proposition 8. Consider the following two opposite scenarios: the transition of the system
is from consecutive small (large) deviations to a large (small) deviation in t − 2. Assume that
t h ev a r i a t i o ni nt h et a r g e tv a r i a b l ea tt i m et−1 is high and comparable with all other previous
deviations of the system. For this type of scenarios, the eﬀort level is highly dependent on the
strategic weights the agent will attach to the large deviations of the system.
Proof. In the appendix. ¥
Sudden signiﬁcative changes in the system behavior can aﬀect diﬀerently the agent’s strategy
to eﬀort over time. Large shifts are correlated with large deviations of the system with respect
to the ﬁxed targets. The shift magnitude generally depends on the system transition type.
We give below three distinct attitudes to eﬀort depending on the agent’s individual percep-
tion about large ﬂuctuations of the system.
13a) the large deviation of the system at time t − 2 (in the context of the ﬁrst scenario) is
much more important for the agent than all other (k1 − 1) large deviations obtained in the
context of the second scenario.










Transition from consecutive small deviations to a large deviation and vice-versa



















transition from consecutive small deviations to a high deviation; l=3; s=0.5; d=1.5
transition from consecutive high deviations to a small deviation; l=3; s=0.5; d=1.5
Figure 18-a)
b) the large deviation of the system at time t−2 (in the context of the ﬁrst scenario) is much
less important for the agent than all other (k1 − 1) large deviations obtained in the context of
the second scenario.







Transition from consecutive small deviations to a large deviation and vice-versa



















transition from consecutive small deviations to a high deviation; l=3; s=0.5; d=1.5
transition from consecutive high deviations to a small deviation; l=3; s=0.5; d=1.5
Figure 19-b)
c) the large deviation of the system at time t − 2 (in the context of the ﬁrst scenario) is
either much more or much less important for the agent than all other (k1 −1) large deviations
obtained in the context of the second scenario.






Transition from consecutive small deviations to a large deviation and vice-versa



















transition from consecutive small deviations to a high deviation; l=3; s=0.5; d=1.5
transition from consecutive high deviations to a small deviation; l=3; s=0.5; d=1.5
Figure 20-c)









Transition from consecutive small deviations to a large deviation and vice-versa



















transition from consecutive small deviations to a high deviation; l=3; s=0.5; d=1.5
transition from consecutive high deviations to a small deviation; l=3; s=0.5; d=1.5
Figure 21-c)
For the four above graphics, the eﬀort level at time t =1 ,...,4 corresponds, respectively, to
the following distinct contexts:
i) system transition from four large (small) deviations to a small (large) deviation; ii) system
transition from three large (small) deviations to a small (large) deviation; iii) system transition
14from two large (small) deviations to a small (large) deviation; and iv) system transition from
a large (small) to a small (large) deviation.
5. Eﬀort-Aversion
The fact that the agent is risk-averse does not give any obvious reason for which one should
a l s os u p p o s et h a th ei se ﬀort-averse. In the real world, this is a common characteristic of most
risk-averse agents. However, this important behavior aspect is ignored in the literature on
risk and eﬀort. Suppose that the agent will ﬁx before starting the control an optimal eﬀort-
threshold e
r_a
max which must not be exceeded during the entire working horizon. Otherwise, the
agent becomes excessively eﬀort-averse for the current period of control. The eﬀort-threshold
e
r_a
max must be selected in order to oﬀer the best characterization of the agent’s type. A higher
(smaller) eﬀort-aversion is correlated with a smaller (higher) threshold e
r_a
max.T h i n k i n gs t r a t e g i -
cally, the agent will ﬁx e
r_a
max superior to e
r_a
1,p. A natural question arrises: From what level, the
eﬀort-threshold can be regarded as large? It will generally depend on the particular environ-
mental context and the agent’s eﬀort-averse type. Let ϕ
r_a
min be a suitable risk-aversion threshold
ﬁxed by the decision-maker before starting the control and for the entire period [1,T].W h e n
this threshold is exceeded, the agent becomes excessively risk-averse for the current period of
control, being characterized by an extreme pessimism (Protopopescu 2007).N o t et h a tt h e
exceeding of the threshold ϕ
r_a
min in t−1 does not necessarily imply an excessive eﬀort behavior
in t. This is generally correlated with the amplitude size of the system deviation in t − 1.W e
plot below this interesting behavior.





























e_max=0.7; phi_min=-0.5; -1 < phi < -0.6; s = 0.5; d=1.5
Figure 22
On the other hand, the exceeding of the threshold e
r_a
max in t is correlated with large ﬂuctua-
tions in the target variable, but not necessarily implies an excessive risk behavior in t−1.F o r
an illustration, we give below a suggestive graphic.
































e_max=0.4; phi_min=-0.6; -0.6 < phi < 0; s = 0.5; d=1.5
Figure 23
15Remark 5. For a low risk-aversion index ϕ
r_a
t−1,pand a high system deviation k yt−1−y
g
t−1 k,
it is possible for the agent to exceed the optimal eﬀort-threshold e
r_a
max for the period t.T h i sm a y
be the case of a dynamic system characterized by large deviations with respect to the optimal
path η. We illustrate this possibility by a numerical example.

























Remark 6.W en o t eh e r et h el o c a lc h a r a c t e ro ft h ea g e n t ’ se ﬀort-aversion. This is deﬁned




t−k1. It will therefore exist some neighborhood
eﬀects of the system dynamics on the eﬀort variable.
Remark 7. The higher (lower) the degree of eﬀort-aversion at time t, the higher (lower)
the value of the eﬀort variable e
r_a
t, p . It is important to distinguish between local eﬀort-aversion
(at time t) and global eﬀort-aversion (over the whole period [1,T]).
In the context of a principal-agent problem, the relationship between the agent’s reaction to
the incentive strategy adopted by the Principal and his atitude to eﬀort is generally complex.
Eﬀort-aversion makes this reaction stronger than eﬀort-neutrality.
Proposition 9. A risk-and-eﬀort averse agent is characterized by a bounded utility function
during the entire period of control.
Proof. In the appendix. ¥
This result can be seen as a step further in the reﬁnement of the agent’s preferences in an
evolving environment. An interesting characterization of the agent’s preferences with respect




max is thus possible. For a numerical illustration, we give
below a suggestive graphic in this sense.











































0.6 local effort level
W=10; c=0.5; phi_min > -0.5; e_max < 0.6
Figure 25




max are exceeded, the agent’s pref-
erences become suboptimal. We illustrate below this type of behavior.









































W=10; c=0.5; phi_min < -0.5; e_max > 0.6
Figure 26
Remark 8.T h ec o n s t a n tc characterizes the agent’s type and is correlated with the choice
of the optimal threshold e
r_a
max. The smaller (higher) the threshold e
r_a
max, the smaller (higher) the
value of the parameter c ﬁxed by the agent.
This allows to better understand the nature of moral hazard and the problems it causes in
the case of a principal-agent relationship stated as a dynamic Stackelberg game. We give below
a suggestive graphic in this sense.





























c = 0.3; phi_min_less = -0.3; e_max_more = 0.3
c = 0.5; phi_min_more = -0.6; e_max_less = 0.7
Figure 27
More exactly, if the Principal will condition the recompense that he is disposed to grant by
an eﬀort level superior to e
r_a
max, then the agent will try to shirk by misrepresenting his type.
Thus the incentive-compatibility constraints imposed by the Principal may not be optimal.
There is a trade-oﬀ between incentive gains and payoﬀ losses.
5.1. Deﬁnition of the threshold e
r_a
max





− k yt−1 − y
g
t−1 k2 Lt−1












max, ∀ t =1 ,...,T
k yt−j − y
g



















17We can thus deﬁne the eﬀort-aversion threshold e
r_a





































































Following Protopopescu (2007), one can distinguish between two types of eﬀort-averse
agents:
i) less eﬀort-averse, in which case, the eﬀort-threshold is deﬁned by:
e
r_a







min,m o r e− 1
ϕ
r_a
min,m o r e− d
ii) more eﬀort-averse, in which case, the eﬀort-threshold is deﬁned by:
e
r_a







min,l e s s− 1
ϕ
r_a
min,l e s s− d
For an illustration, we plot below possible values of the eﬀort-thresholds e
r_a
max,l e s s and
e
r_a
max,m o r e.































































































Proposition 10 An eﬀort-averse agent is characterized by an optimal eﬀort-threshold ﬁxed
according to his individual type.
18Proof. In the appendix. ¥
In this approach, we deal with a continuum of types of agents. The above result allows to
distinguish between agents of common /distinct types. It has strong implications in problems
of moral hasard and adverse selection, improving our understanding as regards the agent’s
psychology to eﬀort in dynamic risky environments. We give below a graphical illustration of
the Proposition 10.







































1.0 regulator parameter s
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 regulator parameter d
T >5; l*=0.2; k1=5; l_more=1
T >5; l*=0.2; k1=5; l_less=10
Figure 31
Proposition 11. There is a positive correlation between the agent’s eﬀort type and the
planning horizon length.
Proof. In the appendix. ¥
Because risk-aversion increases with horizon length (Protopopescu 2007), the agent will
choose a smaller risk-aversion threshold ϕ
r_a
min, and hence a higher eﬀort-aversion threshold e
r_a
max.
The agent is thus more receptive in terms of eﬀort allocation with respect to the ﬁxed objectives.
The horizon length has a non-negligible impact on the agent’s eﬀo r tb e h a v i o ro v e rt i m e .T h e
higher the planning horizon, the larger its impact. The distinction between more and less
eﬀort-averse agents is more (less) pronounced for a large (small) horizon length. We illustrate
below this theoretical result.








































2.0 regulator parameter d
T=2; l*=0.2; k1=1; l_more=1
T=2; l*=0.2; k1=1; l_less=10
Figure 32
This type of result contributes to the theory of incentive contracts by revealing the relation-
ship that exists between contract length and eﬀort allocation. This non-negligible component
must be taken into account when modelling a dynamic mechanism design problem. It has a
positive eﬀect on the agent’s attitude to eﬀort over time.
6. Concluding Remarks and Possible Extensions
The present study explores the impact of endogenous dynamics of an evolving system on the
behavior to eﬀort of a risk-averse agent. From this new perspective, the eﬀort is no more seen
19as a pure disutility, as in the classical approach, but rather as a potential eﬃcient instrument
in order to better manage the system evolution. The agent’s type is deﬁned according to an
optimal eﬀort-threshold ﬁxed before starting the control and for the entire working horizon.
One can thus distinguish between common and distinct types of agents according to their
individual eﬀort-averse preferences. Moreover, it allows to introduce the concept of excessive
eﬀort-aversion, which has strong implications in the context of strategic dynamic interactions,
where both moral hazard and adverse selection eﬀects coexist. This may be the case of a
principal-agent relationship in which the agent’s private information may not be monitorable.
In particular, this type of modelling has the potential to explain why some eﬃcient strategic
incentive-compatibility constraints that cover the entire horizon of the contract do not generally
exist. These do not always induce the agent to reveal his private information, and therefore do
not always capture the agent’s incentive to shirk. The presence of moral hazard and adverse
selection makes the analysis diﬃcult but interesting, revealing the diﬃculties to implement an
incentive Pareto-optimal contract. The Principal cannot observe the agent’s behavior directly,
but only the consequences of his behavior, and those consequences are also inﬂuenced by the
environment. More exactly, the Principal will only observe a variable correlated with the agent’s
eﬀort (the output, an imperfect signal of the eﬀort invested) but he cannot force the agent to
choose an action which is Pareto-optimal. The asymmetric informational structure between the
agent and Principal makes unable this later to solve optimally the eﬀort prediction problem.
It generates a conﬂict between incentive-compatibility and Pareto eﬃciency. The interaction
of the Principal’s policy with the dynamic learning process of the private agent is a reality
which must be fully recognized in incentive design. The proposed study can be extended in
the context of a strategic Nash game with cooperative /non-cooperative players, the objective
h e r eb e i n gt od e ﬁne and characterize the equilibrium path according to an optimal dynamic
eﬀort-sharing. Exploring such possibilities appears to be a good topic for further research. This
provides new theoretical perspectives in understanding the complexity of the eﬀort mechanism.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
































t−1,p, k yt − y
g
t k<k yt−1 − y
g






t−1,p, k yt −y
g
t k>k yt−1 −y
g
t−1 k and Lt <L t−1. Contrary to the previous case,
we have that et+1 >e t.
iii) ϕ
r_a
t, p ≶ ϕ
r_a
t−1,p, k yt − y
g
t k≶k yt−1 − y
g
t−1 k and Lt ≶ Lt−1. In this case, one obtains
either et+1 <e t or et+1 >e t.
T h e r ei st h u sat r a d e - o ﬀ between three endogenous factors: i) the risk-aversion index, ii)
the last deviation of the system, and iii) the importance attached to the last deviation.
Proof of Proposition 2.
This is a direct consequence of the monotony of the local utility function Ut.T h i s i s
increasing in ϕ
r_a




20Proof of Proposition 3.
It is supposed that a risk-averse decision-maker will place a higher importance on the system
deviations compared to an almost risk-neutral one.





































































t−1 k, it is possible to obtain the opposite
























l/ k yt−j1 − y
g
t−j1 k









Depending on the weights attached to the system deviations, the risk-aversion index level
at time t − 1 m a yb em o r eo rl e s sc l o s et o−1 or 0.I fa l lw e i g h t sa p p r o a c h−1, then the index
value will be close enough to −1. The agent is characterized by an excessive risk-aversion at
time t − 1 and a signiﬁcative eﬀort level at time t.
Contrary to what is generally believed or intuition would suggest, the agent can have a
small degree of risk-aversion when the deviations of the system are large. It is the case where
all weights approach 0. The agent is almost risk-neutral, being characterized by a very small
variability in his risk-aversion over time. For this type of scenario, the agent’s eﬀort allocated
at time t is negligible (almost null).
Proof of Proposition 5.








(the average of k0
1 weights)
À
Lt−2 + ... + Lt−(k1+1)
k1
(the average of k1 weights)
The left (right) hand of the above inequality corresponds to the agent’s degree of risk-
aversion at time t − 1 in the case where a higher (smaller) number of backward periods are
taken into account when deﬁning the risk-aversion index. The agent is supposed to attach
a higher importance to the system deviation at time t − 1 for the ﬁrst scenario (k1 periods)
compared to the second one (k0
















This completes the proof.
21Proof of Proposition 6.
A risk-averse agent who manages more and more hardly the evolution of the system is
characterized by an increasing risk-aversion over time (Protopopescu 2007).
Denote by e Lτ the weight attached to the system deviation at time τ =0 ,...,t − 1.T h e

















Each above term (in this order) corresponds to the agent’s eﬀort assignment at time τ =
1,2,...,t. The conclusion follows.
Proof of Proposition 7.
A risk-averse agent who manages better and better the evolution of the system is charac-
terized by a decreasing risk-aversion over time (Protopopescu 2007).
Denote by b Lτ the weight attached to the system deviations at time τ =0 ,...,t − 1.I nt h i s
particular context, the weights are supposed to gradually increase during the period of control.
















This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8.
Denote by ϕ
s_h_k1
t−1,p the risk-aversion index at time t − 1 in the case where the system
transition is from consecutive small deviations to a large deviation. In this case, we have that
ϕ
s_h_k1
t−1,p → Lt−2. Let us denote by ϕ
h_s_k1
t−1,p the risk-aversion index at time t−1 when the system




Lt−3 + ... + Lt−(k1+1)
k1 − 1
where Lt−3,..., Lt−(k1+1) are strategic weights attached to large system deviations (in the context
of the second scenario). One can imagine three distinct situations:
a) the large deviation of the system at time t − 2 (in the context of the ﬁrst scenario) is
much more important for the agent than all other (k1 − 1) large deviations obtained in the
context of the second scenario:
Lt−2 ¿ Lt−3,..., Lt−2 ¿ Lt−(k1+1)
(suﬃcient condition)
⇒ Lt−2 ¿
Lt−3 + ... + Lt−(k1+1)
k1 − 1




t−1,p , and hence a higher degree of risk-aversion at time t − 1






























22In other words, the eﬀort invested by the agent at time t will be higher for the ﬁrst scenario.
b) the large deviation of the system at time t−2 (in the context of the ﬁrst scenario) is much
less important for the agent than all other (k1 − 1) large deviations obtained in the context of
the second scenario:
Lt−2 À Lt−3,..., Lt−2 À Lt−(k1+1)
(suﬃcient condition)
⇒ Lt−2 À
Lt−3 + ... + Lt−(k1+1)
k1 − 1




t−1,p ,a n dt h u sas m a l l e r
degree of risk-aversion at time t − 1 in the context of the ﬁrst scenario. If, in addition, the















In other words, the agent’s eﬀo r ta tt i m et will be smaller in the context of the ﬁrst scenario
compared to the second one.
c) the large deviation of the system at time t−2 (in the context of the ﬁrst scenario) is much
more or much less important for the agent than all other (k1 − 1) large deviations obtained in
the context of the second scenario:
Lt−2 ¿ (or À) Lt−3,..., Lt−2 ¿ (or À) Lt−(k1+1)
























In other words, the agent’s eﬀo r ta tt i m et will be either higher or smaller for the ﬁrst
scenario compared to the second one. This completes the proof.
Remark 9. We have the following sequence of inequalities:
Lt−2 + ... + Lt−(k1+1)
k1
<








Each above ratio (in this order) corresponds to the risk-aversion index at time t − 1 in the
case of a gradual transition from an ineﬀective control to an eﬀective one.
Suppose that the variation in the target variable at time t−1 is high and comparable with
all other previous large deviations of the system. Denote by Lt−1, k (k = k1,...,1)t h ew e i g h t s
attached to the system deviation at time t−1 f o re a c hp a r t i c u l a rc o n ﬁguration described above.
It is supposed that the following inequalities are satisﬁed:























23In this particular context, the environment will incite the agent to invest a smaller eﬀort
level for the same period of control t.







Lt−2 + ... + Lt−(k1+1)
k1
Each above ratio (in this order) corresponds to the risk-aversion index at time t − 1 in the
case of a gradual transition from an eﬀective control an ineﬀective one.
For this type of scenario, it is supposed that:
Lt−1, 1 ≤ Lt−1, 2 ≤ ... ≤ Lt−1,k 1
As above, the variation in the target variable at time t − 1 i sa s s u m e dt ob eh i g ha n d

















In other words, the environment will incite the agent to invest a higher eﬀort for the same
period of control t.











t, p and e
r_a
t, p ≤ e
r_a









We can thus distinguish between two disutility thresholds according to the agent’s individual
type:
i) a smaller disutility threshold, denoted by Us
t(W[1,t],ϕ
r_a
min,m o r e,e
r_a
max,l e s s).
ii) a higher disutility threshold, denoted by Uh
t (W[1,t],ϕ
r_a
min,l e s s,e
r_a
max,m o r e).
Proof of Proposition 10.
Proof.F o l l o w i n gProtopopescu (2007),w eh a v e :
−1 <ϕ
r_a
min,m o r e< −
l∗k1 p
[l∗k1]2 + lmore







min,l e s s< 0
(less risk-averse agent by nature)
where lmore and lless (with 1 ≤ lmore <l less) are two parameters which characterize the agent’s




























(more eﬀort-averse agent by nature)
A less (more) eﬀort-averse agent is characterized by a higher (smaller) degree of eﬀort-
aversion. We distinguish here between “nature” and “type”. The agent is considered eﬀort-
averse by nature, while his “type” is more or less eﬀort-averse. The evolution of the system
over time will reﬁne the agent’s type.
We thus obtain a complete characterization of common /distinct types of agents. The two
ﬁxed thresholds e
r_a
max,l e s s and e
r_a
max,m o r e are not exceeded during the period of control if and
only if the agent succeeds in managing the system trajectory. Two common /distinct types
of agents generally adopt diﬀerent attitudes to eﬀort for the same period of control. In other
words, they are characterized by diﬀerent degrees of eﬀort-aversion over time.
Proof of Proposition 11.
For a higher number of periods T, the value of the parameter k1 c a nb eh i g h e r ,a n dt h u s
the ratio − l∗k1 √
[l∗k1]2+lless
(respectively − l∗k1 √
[l∗k1]2+lmore
) can take a smaller value.
It follows that a more /less eﬀort-averse agent by nature can choose a higher eﬀort-aversion
threshold e
r_a
max,m o r e(respectively e
r_a
max,l e s s). In other words, the agent is disposed to invest a
higher eﬀort over time.
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